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COMMENT 
173 
A RASH DECISION IN SUNNYSLOPE: 





Debtors seeking bankruptcy relief under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) file under Chapter 7,1 Chapter 11,2 
or Chapter 13.3
Unfortunately, it is sometimes unclear what constitutes the 
proper valuation methodology in reorganizations.  Different 
valuation methods, such as replacement value and foreclosure 
value, are available, but there is no uniformity among the courts 
about what value to apply and when.
  In Chapter 7 filings, or “liquidations,” the 
debtor’s assets are sold and the proceeds are shared among the 
creditors subject to the secured creditors’ preference. Chapter 11 
and 13 filings are called “reorganizations” because debtors retain 
their assets after negotiating the payment terms with the 
secured creditor.  In all three filings, the valuation of assets is 
crucial because it determines whether and to what extent a loan 
will be repaid. 
4
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law. 
  Even when a valuation 
method is selected, another problem arises when the debtor and 
creditor disagree over how to calculate such valuation and the 
amount of interest to be applied to loan repayments.  The 
1 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2012). 
2 See generally id. §§ 1101–74. 
3 See generally id. §§ 1301–30. 
4 See, e.g., In re Heritage Highgate, 679 F.3d 132 (3rd Cir. 2012) (invoking 
Rash to apply the current value of collateral instead of a valuation based on income 
capitalization after a future development projection); United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Regional Airports Improvement Corp., 564 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that when a debtor proposes to retain a secured creditor’s collateral under a 
cramdown Chapter 11 plan, a bankruptcy court may not value the collateral based 
on the debtor’s proposed use if that use would result in a value less than what the 
creditor could obtain in foreclosure); In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72, 
74–76 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that when a debtor retains collateral under a Chapter 
11 plan, § 506(a) dictates that the collateral should be valued according to its “fair 
market value” rather than its potentially lower “liquidation value”). 
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inclusion of interest itself is uncontroversial because such 
payments compensate the creditor for the additional risk that the 
debtor may not fulfill a scheduled payment.  The proper amount 
of interest as well as the valuation methodology, however, are 
frequently disputed when a bankruptcy court approves a debtor’s 
proposal over a secured creditor’s objections, a situation known 
as a “cramdown.”5
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to mitigate this 
confusion in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash
  Because the Supreme Court has clarified 
neither when a valuation methodology applies nor how to 
calculate the appropriate interest rate, cramdown cases remain a 
fertile source of confusion over the valuation of a debtor’s assets. 
6 (“Rash”), but 
this decision ultimately raised more questions than it answered.7  
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, decided In re Sunnyslope Housing 
Limited Partnership (“Sunnyslope”). This decision contributed to 
the confusion over valuation by holding that the Rash precedent 
“command[ed]” that cramdown collateral be valued by the 
debtor’s proposed disposition or use of it rather than by the value 
the creditor would realize had the asset been sold in foreclosure, 
even though this was an atypical case where the latter valuation 
exceeded the former.8
In Sunnyslope, Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership 
(“Sunnyslope”) developed and operated an apartment complex in 
Phoenix, Arizona funded by several secured loans.
 
9  To secure 
financing for the building, the debtor agreed that the property 
would be used for affordable housing.10  When Sunnyslope 
defaulted on the loan, the property was resold to First Southern 
National Bank (“First Southern”).11
 
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2012). 
  The sale agreement 
stipulated that the property remain subject to the other 
“covenants, conditions and restrictions,” such as the affordable 
6 Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955–956 (1997). 
7 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); see generally Mark E. 
Beatty, Comment, How Should Property Be Valued in a Cram Down, 49 MERCER L. 
REV. 891, 909 (1998). 
8 In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope III), 859 F.3d 
637, 645 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Rash, 520 U.S. at 960. 
9 Matter of Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope I), No. 12-
CV-00597 (RJH), 2012 WL 12949503 at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2012). 
10 Id. at *1–2. 
11 Id. at *3. 
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housing restriction, and that they would be extinguished upon 
foreclosure.12  First Southern commenced foreclosure 
proceedings, but they were stayed pending completion of 
Sunnyslope’s Chapter 11 reorganization.13  Sunnyslope proposed 
a cramdown plan where it would retain the property and treat 
First Southern’s debt as secure “to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest” in the collateral—the apartment complex—in 
accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).14
Sunnyslope proposed to continue using the property for 
affordable housing after reorganization, and valued it using that 
metric.
  The parties disagreed on 
how to value First Southern’s collateral. 
15  First Southern disagreed, contending that the use 
restrictions should be disregarded for valuation purposes.16  The 
difference in value was significant.  Without the restrictions, a 
receiver obtained a purchase offer of $7.65 million for the 
apartment complex.17  But the bankruptcy court confirmed 
Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan and valued the apartment 
complex with the use restrictions at $3.9 million.18
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s valuation 
of the property with the use restrictions in place,
 
19 but a divided 
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court, holding 
that the court should have valued the apartment complex 
without regard to the affordable housing use restrictions.20  The 
Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s opinion and granted 
Sunnyslope’s petition for rehearing en banc.  The en banc court 
reversed the three-judge panel, holding that the lower court did 
not err in making this determination because United States 
Supreme Court precedent “command[ed]” that cramdown 




12 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 641. 
13 Id. at 641. 
14 Id. at 641–42. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 641. 
18 Id. at 646. 
19 Sunnyslope I, 2012 WL 12949503 at *11. 
20 In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (Sunnyslope II), 818 F.3d 
937, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2016). 
21 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645. 
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The Ninth Circuit grounded its holding in Rash.  The Rash 
Court, according to the Ninth Circuit, held that § 506 of the Code 
requires application of the replacement value, rather than the 
foreclosure value, when valuing collateral for purposes of a 
cramdown.22  Consequently, because Sunnyslope planned to use 
the collateral as an affordable housing complex after 
reorganization, the valuation must be based on the proposed use 
rather than a hypothetical foreclosure sale.23  The court also 
pointed out that the Rash Court intentionally did not adopt a 
rule that values collateral at the higher of its foreclosure or 
replacement value.24  Here, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that 
even in the atypical case where the foreclosure value exceeds 
replacement value, the latter is still the value to apply under §§ 
506(a)(1) and 1129(b).25  The en banc Ninth Circuit also held that 
the reorganization plan was fair and equitable, feasible, and that 
the bankruptcy court did not err in failing to allow First 
Southern, on remand, to make a second election to have its claim 
treated as either fully or partially secured under § 1111(b).26
Dissenting, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that the majority 
opinion “fetishizes a selection of the [Supreme] Court’s words at 
the expense of its logic.”
 
27  Even though cramdown valuations are 
supposed to limit a secured creditor’s risk, the majority’s 
valuation ignored the Court’s expressed desire to reduce the risks 
that cramdowns pose for creditors.28  The dissent would have 
held that the appropriate value of the building is without the use 
restrictions, which, in this case, is best approximated by 
foreclosure value.29
The Supreme Court recently denied First Southern’s petition 
for certiorari in this case,
 
30 preserving a circuit split between the 
Ninth and Fifth Circuits.31
 
22 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955–56 (1997). 
  As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s 
flawed reasoning and holding in Sunnyslope stands.  This 
23 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 640; see also Rash, 520 U.S. at 963. 
24 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645; Rash, 520 U.S. at 960, 962. 
25 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645. 
26 Id. at 646–48. 
27 Id. at 648 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 648. 
30 See First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing, 2018 WL 311350, 
at *1 (Jan. 8, 2018) (denial of certiorari). 
31 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s Sunnyslope decision 
misconstrued the Rash Court’s holding and is divorced from the 
text and structure of the Code.  Rash does not provide a bright-
line rule that answers valuation questions in cramdowns; it 
offers a flexible standard that is compatible with the Code’s 
protections for both debtors and secured creditors.  Further, this 
Comment also argues that Sunnyslope could have been answered 
not as a valuation issue, but as a lien priority issue.  In any 
event, the Ninth Circuit completely missed the mark in 
interpreting the Supreme Court’s holding in Rash and in 
understanding the text and structure of the Code. 
I. COLLATERAL VALUATION IN REORGANIZATIONS 
In a Chapter 11 or 13 reorganization, the secured creditor 
seeks to recoup the highest possible valuation because its claim 
will eventually bifurcate into secured and unsecured claims with 
the deficiency—the amount by which the debt exceeds the value 
of the collateral—treated as unsecured.32
A. Replacement Value of a Debtor’s Collateral 
  Conversely, the debtor 
seeks the lowest possible valuation.  By obtaining a low 
valuation, the debtor is able to discharge a higher amount of the 
debt in question and emerge from the reorganization in a 
stronger financial position.  A creditor’s collateral in a 
reorganization plan is typically valued at either the asset’s price 
realized in foreclosure—the foreclosure value—or the value of its 
proposed disposition or use—the replacement value. 
As the name suggests, the replacement value is the cost a 
debtor would incur to replace the collateral in question.  This 
valuation method is grounded in the second sentence of § 506(a): 
“Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the 
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such 





32 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
33 Id.; see Chris Lenhart, Note, Toward a Midpoint Valuation Standard in 
Cram Down: Ointment for the Rash Decision, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1821, 1839–40 
(1998). 
34 520 U.S. 953, 953 (1997). 
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The Rash Court defined replacement value as the “price a 
willing buyer in the debtor’s trade, business, or situation would 
pay to obtain like property from a willing seller.”35  The majority 
focused on the “proposed disposition or use” language of § 506(a) 
in holding that the replacement value should be considered from 
the debtor’s point of view, rather than the creditor’s.36
[W]here a debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the 
purpose of the valuation is to determine the amount an 
undersecured creditor will be paid for the debtor’s continued 
possession[,] . . . not to determine the amount such creditor 
would receive if it hypothetically had to repossess and sell the 
collateral.
  This 
emphasis was also determinative in In re Trimble, where the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held: 
37
The problem with the Rash Court’s adoption of replacement 
value is its failure to articulate how to calculate such value.  The 
bankruptcy courts were left to determine the “best way of 
ascertaining replacement value” on a case-by-case basis.
 
38  
Consequently, courts are free to apply the retail value, wholesale 
value, or another alternative to value a secured creditor’s 
collateral in reorganizations.39  Proponents argue that because 
the debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, replacement 
value is the correct valuation methodology since it is the amount 
the debtor would be forced to pay to obtain that specific asset.40  
In other words, the secured creditor is compensated for the risk 
of an unsuccessful reorganization by receiving any excess that 
may result from a successful reorganization.41
B. Foreclosure Value of a Debtor’s Collateral 
 
The argument that the foreclosure value, rather than the 
replacement value, of a secured creditor’s collateral should be 
applied in reorganizations is grounded in the first sentence of § 
 
35 Id. at 960. 
36 Id. at 960–65. 
37 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir. 1995). 
38 Rash, 520 U.S. at 965 n.6. 
39 Dawn M. Baumholtz, Bankruptcy-Debtor’s Exercise of the Cramdown 
Option-Valuation Standard for Collateral in Chapter 13, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 469–
70 (1998). 
40 Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1839–40. 
41 Id. at 1842. An excess is created when the secured creditor receives more 
than it would have under either a Chapter 7 liquidation or state law remedies. 
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506(a).42  Justice Stevens, dissenting in Rash, argued that the 
foreclosure valuation is the proper methodology in cramdowns.  
Specifically, the first sentence of § 506(a) shifts the focus from 
the debtor’s perspective to the creditor’s perspective.43  
Proponents also rely on the language of § 506(a), specifically the 
phrase: “the value of the ‘creditor’s interest in the estate’s 
interest’ in the property.”44  Opponents of the foreclosure 
valuation argue that because debtors in cramdowns strive to 
retain the collateral in question, this valuation method ignores 
the second sentence of § 506(a), rendering the “disposition or use” 
language of that section superfluous.45
Creditors and debtors view foreclosure valuation differently.  
Debtors believe that in valuing collateral in the hands of the 
debtor, the foreclosure value embodies the “such creditor’s 
interest in the estate’s interest in such property” language.
 
46  To 
the secured creditor, however, the foreclosure valuation provides 
a windfall to the unsecured creditors by reallocating the spread 
between the foreclosure and replacement values to the unsecured 
class.47
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S MISINTERPRETATION 
 
Sunnyslope is a Chapter 11 case with an atypical valuation 
issue: the foreclosure value of the debtor’s collateral was greater 
than its replacement value.  However, contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding, Rash does not provide a bright-line rule for the 
valuation purposes, even in such an atypical case.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning and ultimate holding is also divorced from the 
text and structure of the Code.  Finally, the facts in Sunnyslope 
hint that this case is not about valuation after all, but rather the 
priority of liens. 
 
42 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
43 Rash, 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994)) (emphasis in original). For example, 
in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, the 
Court held that collateral should be valued “as if it [were] in the creditor’s hands.” 
Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1833. 
45 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
46 Id. 
47 Lenhart, supra note 33, at 1835. 
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A. A Flawed Reading of Rash 
The Sunnyslope court incorrectly held that it is 
“command[ed]” by the Supreme Court’s holding in Rash.48
Our [decision] . . . leaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact, 
identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value 
on the basis of the evidence presented.  Whether replacement 
value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some 
other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of 
the property.
 By 
“tak[ing] the Supreme Court at its word,” the Ninth Circuit 
flouted footnote 6 in the Rash majority opinion, which left 
bankruptcy courts with a wide range of discretion in collateral 
valuations: 
49
In other words, courts could value collateral at the foreclosure 
value even when it exceeds the replacement value.  Yet the Ninth 
Circuit disregarded this built-in flexibility in favor of a myopic 
reading. 
 
The Ninth Circuit also erred by reading Rash to mean that 
when the value of the collateral is lower than the foreclosure 
value as a result of the debtor’s intended use, the secured 
creditor may be given that lesser amount.  Rash can be construed 
to stand for the proposition that the Code’s cramdown provisions 
protect secured creditors when they do not accept a debtor’s plan 
of reorganization.50  In such a case, the creditor receives either 
the collateral itself or cash payments equal to the collateral’s 
value.  When the debtor retains the collateral, as here, the text 
instructs that the debtor pay the secured creditor the “value” of 
its collateral, “determined in light of . . . the proposed disposition 
or use of such property.”51
 
48 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 645. 
  As the Rash Court explained, § 
506(a)’s instruction to value collateral in light of its “proposed 
disposition or use” is designed to protect secured creditors when 
the debtor retains the collateral.  Thus, the “particular use” of 
the retained collateral after reorganization is not dispositive for 
valuation purposes, as the Ninth Circuit overlooked.  Although 
49 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 640; Assoc. Com. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 
965 n.6 (1997). 
50 Brief for Petitioner at 22, First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope 
Housing Limited Partnership, No. 17-455 (U.S., Sept. 22, 2017) [hereinafter “Brief 
for Petitioner”] 
51 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
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foreclosure value is “typically lower” than replacement value, a 
secured creditor’s collateral should not be undervalued in the 
atypical case where foreclosure value exceeds the replacement 
value.52
To read Rash any other way overlooks the fact that applying 
a “generally higher” valuation offsets the additional risk imposed 
on a secured creditor when the debtor retains the collateral.
  Permitting Sunnyslope to shortchange First Southern in 
these circumstances flies in the face of the Code’s protections for 
secured creditors. 
53  
When a debtor surrenders the collateral, the secured creditor 
receives it immediately and is free to sell it, recovering at least 
the foreclosure value.  Therefore, when the Rash Court adopted 
the replacement value standard, it intended to ensure secured 
creditors receive at least the foreclosure value in bankruptcy.54
B. Sunnyslope’s Reasoning is Inconsistent with the Text and 
Structure of the Code 
 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit erred by deeming the price 
offered in foreclosure legally irrelevant because nothing in the 
text of § 506(a) compels this conclusion.  As Rash explained, the 
“proposed disposition or use” refers to the debtor’s two options 
with respect to the secured creditor’s collateral in a cramdown—
either surrender (“disposition”) or retention (“use”)—rather than 
the valuation standard.55  The proper measure of value in the 
retention context, according to Rash, is fair-market value, which 
the Court defined as “the price a willing buyer in the debtor’s 
trade, business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain 
property of like age and condition.”56  The fair-market value of 
property is not necessarily governed by the particular use the 
debtor proposes.57  The Ninth Circuit’s justification that “absent 
foreclosure, . . . Sunnyslope cannot use the property except as 
affordable housing, nor could anyone else,” overlooks the 
disadvantageous position this puts the creditor in.58
 
52 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d 637, 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
  Had 
Sunnyslope wanted to rent the apartment complex out at a 
53 Rash, 520 U.S. at 958. 
54 Rash, 520 U.S. at 959 n.2, 962–63. 
55 Id. at 962. 
56 Id. at 959 n.2. 
57 Id. 
58 Sunnyslope III, 859 F.3d at 644. 
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higher market rate, it could have consented to the foreclosure 
and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.  Sunnyslope 
was entitled to forgo that option and decide to operate the 
property as an affordable housing complex, but the Code does not 
permit Sunnyslope to impose the economic cost of that decision 
on First Southern.59
Section 506(a) also merely instructs courts to value collateral 
“in light of” the debtor’s proposal of continued use.
 
60  The text 
provides no instruction to disregard the value of the collateral 
that would be realized in foreclosure.  In fact, Rash instructs that 
courts should not disregard the asset’s higher fair-market value 
when retained for continued use, but rather limit the secured 
creditor to the asset’s “typically lower” foreclosure value.61
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s holding is not only unhinged 
from the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but it also disregards the 
Code’s statutory scheme for protecting secured creditors.  The 
Code contains numerous provisions, including Chapter 11’s 
cramdown provision at issue, that protect the right of secured 
creditors who have not been paid in full to receive the collateral 
or the economic equivalent.
  
Therefore, the price for which a buyer agreed to purchase the 
asset in a foreclosure sale is categorically relevant. 
62  Another goal of Chapter 11 is to 
avoid foreclosure, but this avoidance should not strip a secured 
creditor of its non-bankruptcy entitlement or the ability to 
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate.63  For example, 
clause (ii) of the cramdown provision ensures that the asset will 
not be sold for less than its foreclosure value,64 and clause (iii) 
protects secured creditors by ensuring that they receive the 
property itself, or a “substitute of the most indubitable 
equivalence.”65  Clause (i) also permits creditors to elect, as First 
Southern did, to receive a stream of payments with a present 
value equal to “at least the value” of the collateral when the 
debtor retains the property.66
 
59 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 24. 
 
60 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
61 Rash, 520 U.S. at 960. 
62 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 25. 
63 Id. 
64 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012). 
65 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); see In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 
941, 942 (2nd Cir. 1935). 
66 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1111(b) (2012). 
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“Value” should be construed consistently throughout the 
Code—at least the value the secured creditor would realize if it 
exercised its right to foreclose.  If the debtor could pay less than 
foreclosure value under clause (i), as the Ninth Circuit held, 
clause (ii) would be superfluous.  It is unlikely Congress enacted 
clause (ii), which set foreclosure value as the floor on a secured 
creditor’s recovery, only to effectively eviscerate those protections 
in clause (i) by permitting the debtor to keep the collateral for a 
lower-value use and pay less.67  The only reading consistent with 
the Code’s text and statutory scheme is that a secured creditor 
cannot be deprived of its right to foreclose and receive “at least 
the property,” unless it is paid at least the foreclosure value.68
C. Lien Priority as the Crux 
 
The Ninth Circuit overlooked that Sunnyslope is not just 
about valuation, but also the priority of liens.  Sunnyslope owned 
the apartment complex subject to secured loans from Capstone 
Realty Advisors (first priority), the City of Phoenix (second 
priority), and the State of Arizona (third priority).69  The first 
priority loan was guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”).70  Critically, only the 
agreements with the City of Phoenix and State of Arizona 
provided that the affordable housing restrictions “run with the 
land” but would be terminated upon foreclosure of the lien.71  
When Sunnyslope defaulted, HUD took over the loan and sold it 
to First Southern.72  The sale agreement between HUD and First 
Southern expressly subordinated the use restrictions to the lien 
of the mortgage.73  Therefore, that subordination agreement is 
enforceable under § 510(a).  Section 510(a) states: “A 
subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title 
to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law.”74
 
67 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 27. 
 
68 Id. (citing In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935)). 
69 Id. at 13. 
70 Sunnyslope II, 818 F.3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 2016). 
71 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 13. 
72 Sunnyslope I, No. 12-CV-00597 (RJH), 2012 WL 12949503 at *3 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 18, 2012). 
73 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 14. 
74 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012). 
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By holding that the valuation must be determined with use 
restrictions in place, the Ninth Circuit effectively reversed the 
priorities of the liens: the senior lien no longer had priority.  This 
is impermissible because the Code does not include any command 
or exception that permits § 506(a) to supersede § 510(a).  
Statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor, so each provision 
should be read by reference to the whole Code.  Thus, § 506(a) 
and § 510(a) should be interpreted in pari materia and 
consistently with one another. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is bittersweet that the Supreme Court did not 
grant certiorari in Sunnyslope.75  The Court is notorious for 
oversimplying complex bankruptcy issues and handing down 
abstruse opinions, begetting further uncertainty.76
For example, the Ninth Circuit’s holding will have negative 
consequences for the credit markets if adopted by other Circuits.  
Even though this was a real estate transaction, the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation could apply in any case a debtor seeks to 
cramdown a secured creditor.  If debtors are free to put a secured 
creditor’s collateral to less valuable economic uses and pay the 
replacement value, then the risk of creditors accepting less than 
the foreclosure value is significantly magnified.
  Rash should 
be construed as a flexible valuation standard determined on a 
case-by-case basis until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, 
rather than a rigid rule that does not account for other provisions 
of the bankruptcy code and practical consequences. 
77
 
75 First Southern National Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing, 2018 WL 311350 
(Jan. 8, 2018) (denial of certiorari). 
  Furthermore, 
76 See e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“We 
turn to the basic question presented: Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured 
dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules 
without the affected creditors' consent? Our simple answer to this complicated 
question is ‘no.’ ”); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (holding that 
although the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to issue a final and 
binding decision on a claim based exclusively on a right assured by state law, the 
bankruptcy court nonetheless lacked the constitutional authority to do so. This 
placed an extreme limitation on the jurisdiction and role of the bankruptcy courts); 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54, 87 
(1982) (holding, behind the backdrop of four separate opinions with varying views on 
how the case should be decided, that bankruptcy courts are prohibited from handling 
fraud-type claims and related disputes against a third party). 
77 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 29–32. 
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adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s decision will also inhibit future 
affordable housing projects.  A reduction in the amount of capital 
available to fund affordable housing projects, and raising the cost 
of such capital, will likely result in fewer and less financially 
stable projects.  The decision will also impact HUD’s ability to 
support the housing market.78  As the three-judge panel noted, 
the risk that a buyer like First Southern might receive less than 
foreclosure value in bankruptcy will “make it much more difficult 
for HUD to sell defaulted loans on the secondary market and 
would drastically reduce the amount that HUD could obtain from 
reselling those loans.”79
 
  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court missed 
an opportunity to correct the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous reading of 
Rash in Sunnyslope.  Hopefully, consensus will emerge among 
the Circuits and bring clarity to this area of bankruptcy law. 
 
78 Id. at 32. 
79 Sunnyslope II, 818 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2016). 
